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Casenote

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly: Mere
Adjustment or Stringent New Requirement
in Pleading?

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,' the United States Supreme Court
seemingly tightened general federal pleading requirements, expressly
abrogating a much-cited linguistic formula from Conley v. Gibson2 and
making the avoidance of early dismissals more difficult for plaintiffs. To
avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, plaintiffs filing antitrust
suits alleging conspiracy must set forth enough facts in the pleadings to
suggest a preceding agreement, as distinct from parallel, independent
action-at least where the parallel conduct is readily explained by lawful
business motivations. 3 The Court further declared that to withstand a
motion to dismiss for legal insufficiency, a complaint must contain
enough allegations of fact to make it "plausible," rather than merely
conceivable, that discovery will disclose grounds for each required

1. 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
2. 355 U.S. 41 (1957), superseded by rule as stated in Berry v. Budget Rent A Car Sys.,
Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
3. Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1961.
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element of a plaintiff's particular claim.4 Applied generally, this test
will make the lenient "notice pleading" regime exemplified by Conley
significantly more stringent. 5
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

William Twombly and Lawrence Marcus filed a putative class action
suit on behalf of local telephone and Internet service subscribers.6 The
complaint claimed that major telecommunications providers created from
the divestiture of AT&T (called Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers
("ILECs")) had violated § 1 of the Sherman Act,7 "which prohibits
'[elvery contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations.""
Twombly and Marcus's complaint alleged that the ILECs conspired to
restrain trade in two ways, each of which they claimed inflated charges
First, the
for local telephone and high-speed Internet services.
complaint alleged that the ILECs conspired to prevent competitive entry
into their respective markets by engaging in parallel conduct aimed at
inhibiting the growth of potential upstart carriers so that such carriers
would be discouraged from breaking into the business. Twombly and
Marcus claimed that to prevent competitive entry, the ILECs made
unfair agreements with the upstart carriers by providing them with
inferior connections, overcharging them, and using billing methods
designed to sabotage the relationship between the upstart carriers and
their customers. Second, the complaint alleged that the ILECs made
agreements to refrain from competing against one another by allocating
customers and markets to one another and that such agreements should
be inferred from the ILECs' common failures to pursue advantageous
business opportunities in competitive markets. Twombly and Marcus
claimed that the agreements were also evidenced by the statement of
ILEC's chief executive officer that it was not "right" to compete in the
territory of another ILEC. 9
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) ("Rule 12(b)(6)").1 ° The district court held that the plaintiffs

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 1965.
Id. at 1959-60.
Id. at 1962.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1961-62 (brackets in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1).
Id. at 1962.
Id. at 1963; FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
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must allege additional facts that exclude independent, self-interested
conduct as an explanation for the parallel actions. The district court
further found that the allegations of parallel conduct were inadequate
because the ILECs had possible business justifications for defending
their individual territories. 1
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
holding that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) ("Rule
8(a)(2)"), 2 the district court used the wrong standard to test the
complaint for factual sufficiency.' 3 The court of appeals ruled that
"'plus factors are not requiredto be pleaded to permit an antitrust claim
based on parallel conduct to survive dismissal.""' 4 Further, the court
of appeals held the plaintiffs' parallel conduct allegations to be sufficient
because the ILECs failed to show, under the much-cited linguistic
formula from Conley v. Gibson, 5 that "no set of facts" existed that
6
would permit the plaintiffs to demonstrate collusion.'
Because the district court and the court of appeals disputed the proper
standard for pleading antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel
conduct, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed the Second Circuit's holding in a 7-2 decision. 1 7 The Court
held that stating a conspiracy claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act
requires allegations of enough factual matter to suggest that a preceding
agreement was made; allegations of parallel conduct coupled with "bare"
assertions of conspiracy will not suffice.'"
III.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

David Dudley Field developed the influential New York Code of
Procedure, 19 deemed the "Field Code," which was adopted in 1848.0
This code "required '[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of
action, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in such
a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what

11.
12.
13.
14.
S. Ct.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1963.
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1963.
Id. (quoting Twombly v. Bell AtI. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005), rev'd, 127
1955 (2007)).
355 U.S. 41 (1957).
Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1963.
Id.
Id. at 1966.
1848 N.Y. LAWS 497.
Id.; Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1976 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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is intended."'21 However, the Field Code did not specify whether
evidentiary facts or legal facts were required to be pleaded or whether
"ultimate facts" could satisfy its test.22 Similar language also appeared
in the Federal Equity Rules,23 adopted in 1912, as well as in English
practices.24 The Field Code, Federal Equity Rules, and English
practices all required plaintiffs to plead "facts" rather than "conclusions,"
but the distinction between these requirements was unclear.25 Field
Code pleadings were required to fulfill four functions: (1) to put the
opposing party on notice of the pleadings; (2) to state relevant facts; (3)
to narrow the issues to be litigated; and (4) to provide a means for quick
disposition of frivolous claims and insufficient defenses. 26 Accordingly,
courts dismissed many claims for deficient pleadings without reaching
the merits of their respective controversies. Thus, before the era of
modern pleading began with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ("Federal Rules") in 1938, a plaintiff could only survive a
motion to dismiss if pleaded facts that, if true, showed the plaintiff's
legal rights had been violated.28 However, without pretrial discovery,
ordinarily conducted only after the filing of initial pleadings, 29 the
plaintiff lacked the ability to plead sufficient facts.3 °
In response to the confusion regarding which pleaded facts or
conclusions were sufficient and to enable courts to reach the merits of
controversies more frequently, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 ("Rule
8")31 substituted "notice" pleading for fact pleading.32 Rule 8 replaced
the dominant pleading standard that existed before the adoption of the
Federal Rules-the formula requiring "'facts' constituting a 'cause of
action,'"-with the requirement of a "'claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.' "M Rule 8(a)(2) requires the complaint to indicate
"the nature of the plaintiff's claim with only enough specificity to enable

21. Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1976 (brackets in original) (quoting 1848 N.Y. LAWS
at 521).
22. Id.
23. FED. EQUITY R. 25 (1912) (repealed 1938).
24. Bell Atlantic Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1975-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 9 W.
HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 324-27 (3d ed. 1926)).
25. Id. at 1976.
26. 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1202 (3d ed. 2004).
27. Id.
28. Am. Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 723 (7th Cir. 1986).
29. But see FED. R. CIV. P. 27(a)(1).
30. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 26, at § 1202; Am. Nurses' Ass'n, 783 F.2d at 723.
31. FED. R. Crv. P. 8.
32. Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1976 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33. Id. (quoting WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 25, at § 1216).
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the parties to determine the preclusive effect of a judgment disposing of
the claim."34 In promulgating Rule 8, the drafters intentionally did not
refer to "facts" or "conclusions," and thus the "'liberal notice pleading of
Rule 8(a) [was] the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which
was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.'" '3
Rule 8 provides the foundation of pleading requirements under the
Federal Rules, particularly subsections (a)(2), (e), and (f), which indicate
36
that pleadings are to be construed liberally as justice requires.
Further, the Federal Rules limit the purpose of pleadings to putting
opposing parties on notice of the transaction giving rise to the claim and
one or more recognized--or even emerging or imaginable-legal theories
warranting relief.37 Therefore, the Federal Rules leave factual elaboration of claims and defenses to the period of discovery and other pretrial
processes.3"
Rule 8 has been amended in minor ways twice. Despite these
revisions, Rule 8 has been the subject of a fair amount of controversy
since its promulgation regarding what must be included in pleadings.3 9
Judge Charles E. Clark, the principal draftsman of the Federal Rules,
proposed amendments to Rule 8 to make it clear that facts were not
required in pleadings, but such proposals were never enacted.40
Additionally, the 1955 Advisory Committee prepared a note to Rule
8(a)(2) that definitively rejected contentions that the rule required
pleadings of facts and causes of action, yet the note was never officially
approved.4 1 However, all of these proposals evince the strong convictions of the Advisory Committee, Judge Clark, and others, which are
that factual pleading should not be required under Rule 8.42 Thus, the
notice requirement of Rule 8 has not been applied to measure the legal
sufficiency of complaints by the "evidentiary" or "conclusory" nature of
their constituent allegations; instead, Rule 8 measures whether the
totality of the allegations, if temporarily accepted as true, puts opposing
parties on notice of the transaction and also contains one or more

34. Am. Nurses'Ass'n, 783 F.2d at 723.
35. Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1976 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)).
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 8; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 25, at § 1201.
37. See, e.g., Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
38. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 26, at § 1202; see, e.g., Am. Nurses'Ass'n, 783 F.2d
at 723.
39. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 26, at § 1201.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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arguable relief-worthy theories. 43 As a result, courts have upheld
complaints that gave opposing parties such notice, regardless of whether
4
that was accomplished by allegations of "fact" or conclusions of "law."
Further, Judge Clark stated that pleadings do not require proof to be
set forth; rather, all that can be expected from pleadings is "'a general
statement distinguishing the case from all others, so that the manner
and form of trial and remedy expected are clear, and so that a permanent judgment will result.' 45 By drafting Rule 8 in a manner that
eliminates the necessity of pleading facts, Judge Clark intended to
relieve courts of the previous time-consuming role of analyzing which of
the facts provided, if any, were sufficient.4" Sometimes conclusory
allegations were considered sufficient because the new system restricted
"'the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving and invest[ed] the
deposition-discovery process with a vital role in the preparation for
trial.' 47 A striking example of a sufficient "bare" allegation is illustrated by Form 948 in the appendix of the Federal Rules, which was
considered adequate, despite its brevity. 49 This example provides the
defendant with no notice of what acts or omissions a plaintiff using
Form 9 contends constitute negligence, but it permits a plaintiff using
the form to proceed merely by alleging that the defendant "'negligently
drove.'" 5
In addition, Rule 12(b)(6)5" tests the sufficiency of a claim.5 2 Under
Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a case for "failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted."53 The objective of Rule 12 is
generally to "expedite and simplify the pretrial procedures of federal
litigation." 54 Additionally, Rule 12(b)(6) serves as a procedural vehicle
by which a defendant can test, throughout trial,55 the complaint's

43. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 26, at § 1202, at 87.
44. Id.
45. Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1976 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Charles E.
Clark, The New FederalRules of Civil Procedure:The Last Phase-UnderlyingPhilosophy
Embodied in Some of the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A.J. 976, 977
(1937)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1977 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947)).
48. FED. R. CIV. P. Form 9.
49. Id.
50. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. Form 9).
51. FED. R. Clv. P. 12(b)(6).
52. Yoichiro Hamabe, Functionsof Rule 12(b)(6) in the FederalRules of Civil Procedure:
A CategorizationApproach, 15 CAMPBELL L. REV. 119, 121 (1993).
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
54. Hamabe, supra note 50, at 122.
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2).
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compliance with Rule 8.56 Rule 8 further allows a court to dismiss a
complaint before a proceeding develops. 7
In 1957, the same year Judge Clark asserted that factual pleadings
were not required under Rule 8, the United States Supreme Court in
Conley v. Gibson58 clarified the pleading requirements as they relate to
motions to dismiss.5 9 A unanimous Supreme Court held that "a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."6N The Court's
"no set of facts" language in Conley permitted dismissal only when
proceeding to discovery would be futile.6 1 Further, the language has
been cited by federal courts over 10,000 times since the decision.6 2
In Conley the Supreme Court cited three court of appeals cases which
explain the meaning and scope of the holding.63 First, in Leimer v.
State Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Worcester, Massachusetts,s4 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that to
warrant dismissal without granting leave to amend,65 "'it should
appear from the allegations that a cause of action does not exist, rather
than that a cause of action has been defectively stated.' 66 Further, the
court in Leimer held that there was no justification for dismissing a
complaint because of the insufficiency of statements, unless it was clear
that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief.6 Second, in Continental Collieries, Inc. v. Shober,6" the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit concluded that facts were in dispute so that "[njo
matter how likely it may seem that the pleader will be unable to prove
his case, he is entitled, upon averring a claim, to an opportunity to try
to prove it." 69 Finally, in Dioguardi v. Durning,70 Judge Clark,

56. Hamabe, supra note 52, at 121.
57. Id.
58. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
59. See id. at 44-48.
60. Id. at 45-46.
61. Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1977 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157 n.7 (2d Cir. 2007).
63. See Dioguardi, 139 F.2d 774; Cont'l Collieries, Inc. v. Shober, 130 F.2d 631 (3d Cir.
1942); Leimer v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of Worcester, Mass., 108 F.2d 302 (8th Cir.
1940).
64. 108 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1940).
65. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
66. Leimer, 108 F.2d at 305 (quoting Winget v. Rockwood, 69 F.2d 326, 329 (8th Cir.
1934)).
67. Id. at 305-06.
68. 130 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1942).
69. Id. at 635.
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writing for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
emphasized the importance of giving each plaintiff "his day in court."71
Dismissal under the Federal Rules was further discussed in American
Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois,72 in which Judge Posner, writing for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit summarized
decades of pleading practice under Conley.73 The court observed that
the "no set of facts" language in Conley should not be interpreted
literally because otherwise, dismissal would be permitted only in
frivolous cases."4 A complaint should only be dismissed when a
plaintiff chooses to plead facts which counteract his or her entitlement
to relief by negating an element of his or her claim.75 In that rare
situation, it would be illogical to permit further factual development of
the claim because the allegations constitute binding admissions that
make recovery legally impossible.76 Judge Posner further stated that
a complaint could not be dismissed merely because one of its central
theories-and the facts alleged in support of that theory-does not make
out a sufficient claim for relief.7 7
Moreover, in 1993 the Supreme Court held in Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit78 that motions to
dismiss were not the proper mechanism for combating potential
discovery abuse, stating, "In the absence of [an amendment to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) 79], federal courts and litigants must rely on
summary judgment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious
claims sooner rather than later.""° Additionally, in the recent unanimous opinion of Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,

the Court held that

Rule 8(a)(2) does not allow courts to pass on the merits of claims at the
pleading stage; instead, the Federal Rules encourage a relaxed pleading
standard that "relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment
motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims."82

70.

139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 775.
783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 727.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

507 U.S. 163 (1993).
FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b).
Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168-69.
534 U.S. 506 (2002).
Id. at 512.
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The courts in Leatherman and Swierkiewicz promoted liberal
interpretations of the pleading rules, but several cases have described
the pleading standard set forth in Conley more restrictively.83 For
example, in Car Carriers,Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,4 the Supreme Court
asserted that the holding in Conley had never been interpreted literally
and that "[in practice, 'a complaint . . . must contain either direct or
inferential allegations respecting all the material elements
necessary to
8 s5
sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.'
86
The Federal Rules do require "particularity" or "heightened"
pleading of facts when pleading specially delineated matters, such as
averments of fraud or mistake, capacity, special damages, or admiralty
and maritime claims, as set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9
("Rule 9")."7 These provisions demand that particular facts be pleaded

in detail.8 Further, although not associated with Rule 9, heightened
pleading is also required in securities cases pursuant to the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA), s9 which requires plaintiffs
to set forth "with particularity both the facts constituting the alleged
violation, and the facts evidencing scienter," such as the defendant's
intention "'to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.'"9 ° However, with the
exception of the heightened pleading requirements in Rule 9 or as
required by the PSLRA of 1995, the Supreme Court has insisted,9 1 and
still maintains in Bell Atlantic Corp., that the more forgiving standard
of pleading Rule 8(a)(2) is to apply transsubstantively to all other types
of claims.92

83. See, e.g., Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1984).
84. 745 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1984).
85. Id. at 1106 (alteration in original) (quoting Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos., 727 F.2d
648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984)).
86. "Heightened" pleading refers to the detailed pleading of facts as compared to the
minimal pleading of facts; the Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. did not require heightened
pleading. 127 S. Ct. at 173 n.14.
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 9.
88. Id.
89. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
and 18 U.S.C.).
90. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504 (2007) (quoting
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 188 (1976)) (holding that plaintiffs in securities
cases must "'state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the required state of mind"' (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000))).
91. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168-69; Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511-12.
92. 127 S. Ct. at 1973-74. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
rejected special pleading requirements in Nagler v. Admiral Corp., where it noted that
courts "naturally shrink from the injustice of denying legal rights to a litigant for the
mistakes in technical form of his attorney." 248 F.2d 319, 322 (2d Cir. 1957). The court
also stated that although antitrust litigation is commonly wide in scope and costly, the law
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Finally, plaintiffs filing claims under § 1 of the Sherman Act,93 like
the plaintiff in Bell Atlantic Corp., must meet special requirements.94
Liability under § 1 requires a "contract, combination .

. .,

or conspiracy,

in restraint of trade or commerce."95 Because § 1 of the Sherman Act
requires a contract, combination, or conspiracy, the court must determine whether the "challenged anticompetitive conduct 'stem[s] from
96
independent decision or from an agreement, tacit or express.'
Further, "'conscious parallelism'. . . of 'firms in a concentrated market
[that] recogniz[e] their shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to price and output decisions' is 'not in itself
unlawful."'9 7 Therefore, at the summary judgment stage, a § 1 plaintiff
must present evidence of a conspiracy that "tend[s] to rule out the
possibility that the defendants were acting independently."9"
IV.

COURT'S RATIONALE

A.

The Majority Opinion
In accepting the ILECs' arguments challenging the sufficiency of
Twombly and Marcus's putative class action complaint, the Supreme
Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly9 s authored a multi-faceted
opinion in which the Court ultimately declared that it would not require

is quite clear that particularity pleading does not apply to antitrust cases because the
Federal Rules of Procedure do not contain any special exceptions for such cases; thus, Rule
8 applies to all other types of cases transsubstantively, including antitrust litigation. Id.
at 322-23.
In Leatherman the majority held pleading requirements could not be expanded beyond
their appointed limits and that potential discovery abuse should not be combated in
motions to dismiss. 507 U.S. at 168-69. Further, in Swierkiewicz the Court unanimously
held that "under a notice pleading system, it is not appropriate to require a plaintiff to
plead facts establishing a prima facie case." 534 U.S. at 511. Instead, the Court held that
the simplified notice pleading standard of the Federal Rules "relies on liberal discovery
rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose
of unmeritorious claims." Id. at 512. The dissent in Bell Atlantic Corp. thus asserted that
even if the majority's speculation about the strength of Twombly's and Marcus's claims was
accurate, the majority's "plausibility" standard was inappropriate and irreconcilable with
these cases and the Federal Rules. 127 S. Ct. at 1983 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1964 (brackets in original) (quoting Theatre Enters.,
Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954)).
97. Id. (brackets in original) (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993)).
98. Id.
99. 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
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specific factual pleadings for antitrust cases alleging conspiracy.'0 0
However, the Court did require a plaintiff to include enough facts to
state a claim for relief that was plausible, rather than conceivable, on its
face. 1"' The Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals and
held that the complaint was not sufficient to state a claim. 0 2
Writing for the 7-2 majority, Justice Souter overturned the decision of
the court of appeals by first examining what did not constitute a
showing of an unlawful agreement under the Sherman Act.0 3 The
Court determined that because parallel business activity and conscious
parallelism, while consistent with conspiracy, could be justified by
simply alleging parallel
reference to legitimate business strategies,
0 4
conduct was not sufficient to state a claim.
Next, the Court noted that the purpose of Rule 8(a)(2),' °5 which
requires only "'a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief,""' is to put a defendant on notice of the
substance of the plaintiff's claim as well as the grounds upon which that
claim rests. ° 7 The Court asserted that detailed factual allegations are
not required for a plaintiff's complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) 08
motion, but the plaintiff must set forth some facts.10 9 If the plaintiff
fails to allege more than labels, conclusions, blanket assertions of
entitlement to relief, speculative factual allegations, and elements of a
cause of action, the defendant may not receive sufficient notice. 10
The Court then applied its discussion of Rule 8(a)(2) to a § 1 Sherman
Act claim, stating that a § 1 claim "requires a complaint with enough
factual matter ([when] taken as true) to suggest" and make it "plausible"
that the plaintiff could ultimately prove that an agreement was actually
made."' The majority provided several examples of when pleadings
would satisfy this standard, including: when the plaintiff provides (1)
"facts that are suggestive enough to render a § 1 conspiracy plausible";112 (2) a "'plain statement' [as specified in Rule 8(a)(2)] pos-

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 1974.
Id.
Id. at 1963.
Id. at 1964; 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1964.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1964 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Id. (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65.
Id.
Id. at 1965.
Id.
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sess[ing] enough heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief'"; 113 or (3) "enough facts to state a claim to relief that isplausible
on its face."114 The Court again asserted that it was not imposing
heightened pleading requirements; instead, it claimed to be tightening
factual pleadings to raise all parties' expectation that discovery would
reveal evidence of the alleged preceding illegal agreement, even if
proving the existence of such an agreement seemed improbable to a
judge." 5 Therefore, in an antitrust conspiracy allegation, the Court
interpreted Rule 8(a)(2) to require that the plaintiff's complaint contain
enough "factual enhancement" to cross the "line between possibility and
plausibility of 'entitle[ment] to relief.'""' 6
The Court next turned to policy arguments in support of its tightened
pleading requirements. First, the Court discussed the benefits-to all
parties-of the early dismissal of claims that do not raise an entitlement
to relief."7 The Court stated that while it is important to be cautious
when dismissing an antitrust complaint before discovery, it is also
important to remember the great expense involved in antitrust
discovery; therefore, courts must require some specificity in pleadings
18
before allowing such a massive factual controversy to proceed.
Additionally, the Court noted that the potential expense of discovery in
this case was extremely large." 9 Although the plaintiffs' counsel
reassured the Court that discovery would be limited, the Court
concluded that too much uncertainty existed. 20 As a result, the Court
held that allegations under § 1 of the Sherman Act must suggest
conspiracy to survive a motion to dismiss.' 2'
The plaintiffs' main argument against the Court's plausibility
standard at the pleading stage was that the standard conflicted with
Conley v. Gibson,22 which stated that "'a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless ...

the plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim.'"'23 However, the Court rejected
that argument, noting that otherwise, a wholly conclusory claim would

113. Id. at 1966 (third brackets in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
114. Id. at 1974.
115. Id. at 1965.
116. Id. at 1966 (brackets in original) (quoting DM Research, Inc. v. Coll. of Am.
Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 55 (1999)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1966-67.
119. Id. at 1967.
120. Id.

121. Id.
122.
123.

355 U.S. 41 (1957).
Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1968 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46).
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survive so long as direct evidence of conspiracy could possibly be
unearthed. 124 After giving several examples of when courts have
refused to accept the Conley standard, the Court retired the renowned
"no set of facts" language from Conley, even as it reaffirmed the Court's
12 5
view in Conley that the complaint in that case was sufficient.
Finally, the Court applied its discussion to Twombly and Marcus's
complaint by examining it for plausibility, concluding that the allegations of conspiracy were insufficient.126 Also, because the protection
of economic self-interests by the ILECs served as a natural explanation
for their behavior, the Court concluded that it had a duty to require
more than mere allegations of parallel decisions in pleadings; otherwise,
pleading a § 1 Sherman Act violation against any group of competing
defendants "would be a sure thing."2 v
Therefore, while the Court eschewed reliance on any heightened
pleading standards, it concluded that antitrust conspiracy was not
suggested or made "plausible" by the facts adduced in the complaint. 2 '
Thus, the complaint did not state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. 2 ' Because Twombly and Marcus did not nudge the claims
"across the line from conceivable to plausible," the Court dismissed the
complaint.130
B.

Justice Stevens's Dissent

Justice Stevens's dissent, joined in part by Justice Ginsburg,
questioned the majority's decision, arguing that it effectually relieves
defendants of having to file an answer.' 3 ' According to the dissent, the
majority's conclusion that the complaint was not plausible did not stand
as a legally acceptable reason to dismiss Twombly and Marcus's
complaint. 132
For the dissent, although the ILECs' actions were
consistent with natural business behavior, it was enough that those
actions were equally consistent with the presence of an illegal agreement
as alleged in the complaint. 3 ' The dissent therefore concluded that

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

1968-69.
1969.
1970.
1971.
1974.

at 1975 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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depositions 4 or limited discovery should have been permitted before
1
dismissal. 1
Further, because the complaint alleged unlawful conduct, Justice
Stevens noted that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as longstanding
precedent, required a response from the ILECs before the case was
dismissed.'35 Justice Stevens then set forth two possible explanations
for the majority's "dramatic departure" from settled procedural law: (1)
the expensive nature of private antitrust litigation and (2) the risk that
jurors might mistakenly conclude that evidence of parallel, conduct
proved the parties acted under agreement rather than under independent decisions. 3 6
However, Justice Stevens asserted that these
explanations for the majority's decision were not sufficient to justify the
dismissal of an adequately pleaded complaint without first requiring the
ILECs to answer.13 7
Further, the explanations did not justify an
interpretation of the Federal Rules that turns more on the majority's
assessment of the plausibility of factual allegations rather than the legal
sufficiency of the allegations.3 8 Justice Stevens also concluded that
the purpose of the relaxed pleading standards of Rule 8(a)(2) was to keep
litigants in court rather than out of court and that the merits of a claim
would be sorted out during pretrial processes.'39
Justice Stevens argued that the majority inappropriately applied a
heightened pleading standard; despite the majority's disclaimers, Justice
Stevens could find no other explanation for why the majority identified
the failure in Twombly and Marcus's complaint not as a failure of notice
but rather a failure to show that the agreement between the ILECs may
have actually and plausibly occurred. 4 ° Justice Stevens viewed the
majority's decision as effectively requiring plaintiffs to plead with
particularity for issues not covered by Rule 9.141 Nonfactual allegations, such as those in the complaint in Bell Atlantic Corp., should
suffice if the purpose of pleadings is simply to give general notice as the
majority opinion stated. 4 2 Additionally, Justice Stevens questioned
the majority's statement that other courts had failed to support the "no
set of facts" language from Conley as shown in his decision to eulogize
Conley by recognizing citations to the case in sixteen opinions by the

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1976.
Id. at 1984.
Id. at 1983-84; FED. R. CIV. P. 9.
127 S. Ct. at 1977 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court, none of which had expressed any doubt about the rule
in Conley or "criticized" or "explained away" that language.'4 3 Finally,
Justice Stevens noted that the majority in Conley never mentioned a
plausibility appraisal like that focused on by the majority in Bell
Atlantic Corp.'4 4
V.

IMPLICATIONS

The decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 45 leaves many
unanswered questions about whether the United States Supreme Court
has heightened pleading requirements for federal civil complaints.
Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari with the goal of
clarifying an area of law that had been the subject of controversy, the
Court's opinion has led to even more of a procedural morass through
which lower courts and litigants must now wade in applying this rule.
Real doubt exists regarding the scope of the Court's decision. For
example, does this holding require fact pleading only for antitrust cases?
Does it require fact pleading only for antitrust cases alleging conspiracy
or parallel behavior? Or, as exemplified by the majority opinion's
conspicuously extensive dictum and underscored by Justice Stevens's
dissent, does the opinion insist on a more exacting pleading under Rule
8(a)(2) 4 ' transsubstantively for all federal civil claims? The Court
repeatedly denied that it was requiring heightened pleading, yet it (1)
specifically overruled the key "no set of facts" language from the seminal
case of Conley v. Gibson;.4v (2) discussed a new "plausibility" standard;
and (3) avowed-for the first time since Conley-that
it does, at least in
14
some contexts, require the pleading of facts.
Throughout the majority opinion, the Court indicated, despite its
recurrent assertions otherwise, that it intended to make some alteration
in the pure notice pleading regime that has prevailed for the halfcentury since Conley. 49 However, the full extent of this alteration
remains uncertain because the Court's reasoning contains several
inconsistent signals. 50 Several signals suggest that the Court has
heightened pleading requirements across the full spectrum of federal

143. Id. at 1978.
144. Id. at 1979-80.
145. 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007).
146. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
147. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
148. Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1964-66.
149. Id. at 1964-65.
150. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155-57 (2d Cir. 2007).
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civil litigation.'5 1 First, the Court explicitly disavowed the "no set of
facts" language from Conley as having "earned its retirement" and as
"best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading
standard."'5 2 Second, the Court indicated that in the setting of § 1 of
the Sherman Act,153 a pleading must do more than put the opposing
party on general notice.'
For example, the Court requires a plaintiff
to plead enough facts to raise the inference that discovery would reveal
evidence of an illegal agreement, allegations plausibly suggesting an
agreement, 5 5 and enough alleged facts to push a plaintiff's legally
required claim elements across the line from conceivable to plausible.'56 The Court combined these various formulations into a new
"plausibility" standard.5 7 Third, although it did not consider the
possible utility of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) ("Rule 12(e)") '
motions for more definite statements, the Court expressed its doubts
that careful case management of discovery would reliably relieve
defendants of unwarranted, burdensome discovery.'59 Fourth, the
majority's language indicates that the Court was looking anew at
pleading requirements generally and establishing a new standard to be
applied0 henceforth ("it is time for a fresh look at adequacy of plead16
ing").

At several points throughout Bell Atlantic Corp., the majority candidly
acknowledged that it will require the pleading of facts. For example, the
Court stated that the Federal Rules were never intended to dispense
with fact pleading altogether.'6 ' While the Federal Rules eliminated
any general requirement for plaintiffs to set forth in detail the facts
upon which a claim rests (heightened pleading), the Federal Rules still
required a "'showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to

151. Id. at 155-56.
152. Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1969.
153. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
154. Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1965.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1974.
157. Id. at 1968.
158. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e); Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 158 (noting that the Supreme Court in
Bell Atlantic Corp. overlooked Rule 12(e)); see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,
598 (1998) (noting that a court could, after the filing of a complaint and before discovery,
require a plaintiff to "'put forward specific, nonconclusory factual allegations' . . . in order
to survive a prediscovery motion for dismissal or summary judgment" (quoting Siegert v.
Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
159. Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1967.
160. Id. at 1968 n.7.
161. Id. at 1965 n.3.
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relief."' 62 Further, the Court stated that "[o]n certain subjects understood to raise a high risk of abusive litigation, a plaintiff must state
factual allegations with greater particularity than Rule 8 requires."16 3
Additionally, the Court rejected Twombly and Marcus's complaint
because, when viewing their allegations as a whole, the claimed
conspiracy was merely "conceivable," not "plausible."'64 The extensiveness of the majority's dictum, coupled with the critical light that the
dissenting opinion shed on the majority's opinion, suggests that the
Court did heighten the standard used to judge the sufficiency of
pleadings at the complaint stage.
On the other hand, additional signals could be read to suggest that the
Court is either (1) not changing pleading requirements generally or (2)
is changing requirements only as they apply to § 1 allegations under the
Sherman Act.'6 5 First, the Court on several occasions disclaimed that
it was making pleading requirements more rigid but insisted it was not
requiring particularized pleadings. 6 6 According to Justice Souter,
"[W]e do not apply any 'heightened' pleading standard, nor do we seek
to broaden the scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9, which can only
be accomplished 'by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not
by judicial interpretation.' 1 6 7 However, the disclaimer that the Court
was not requiring "heightened" or detailed fact pleading is still
consistent with its new requirement of pleading some facts. Second, the
Court often cited to Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,16 a case that
explicitly rejected heightened pleading standards. Third, the Court
approvingly noted Form 9 of the Complaint for Negligence,' 6 9 which is
a plain and short statement of a generalized allegation of negligence. 7 °
Fourth, the Court possibly limited its holding to § 1 Sherman Act claims
and claim-specific policies, as supported by its focus on the large costs
and the amount of time that would be incurred if cases like this were to
proceed to full discovery upon bare allegations in a complaint.'7 ' This
rationale further suggests that the Court's adjustment of pleading
standards may be limited to cases involving massive discovery costs and

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
Sorema
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 1965 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Id. at 1973 n.14 (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2)).
Id. at 1974.
Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 156-57.
Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1973-74.
Id. at 1973 n.14 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Swierkiewicz v.
N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002)).
534 U.S. 506 (2002).
FED. R. CIV. P. Form 9.
Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1970 n.10.
Id. at 1966-67.
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time pressures, such as § 1 claims. Fifth, because the Court left the
rules from Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence &
Coordination Unit172 and Swierkiewicz undisturbed, it is likely that
detailed or heightened fact pleading will usually be confined to the 17
few
3
Federal Rules or statutory provisions that require such a pleading.
Finally, only one month after issuing its opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp.,
the Supreme Court in Erickson v. Pardus174 stated that "[sipecific facts
are not necessary" in pleading as long as the complaint gives the
defendant fair notice, peculiarly citing Bell Atlantic Corp. as the
authority for this point. 175 However, it is also possible that this
particular reference to Bell Atlantic Corp. is simply the Court distinguishing between detailed or heightened fact pleading, which is very
seldom required, and the pleading of some facts, which may become
more generally required after Bell Atlantic Corp. Nevertheless, when
taken as a whole, these signals may indicate that the Court in Bell
Atlantic Corp. was limiting its stricter pleading requirements to
antitrust cases and perhaps only to antitrust cases alleging parallel
conduct.
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Iqbal v. Hasty 76 attempted to reconcile these conflicting signals by
concluding that whether a plaintiff is required to plead factual allegations depends on the context of the case. 171 In addressing Bell Atlantic
Corp., the court of appeals in Iqbal stated, "the Court . . . is instead
requiring a flexible 'plausibility standard,' which obliges a pleader to
amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where
such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.""' Additionally, the court of appeals discussed the considerable uncertainty
regarding the standard for assessing the adequacy of pleadings that
resulted from Bell Atlantic Corp."9 The court of appeals stated, "If we
were to consider only a narrow view of the holding of that decision, we
would not make any adjustment in our view of the applicable pleading
standard."8 °
Although the Supreme Court, at points throughout Bell Atlantic Corp.,
asserted that its decision only applies to antitrust cases alleging

172. 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
173. Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1973 n.14.
174. 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007).
175. Id. at 2200 (citing Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1959).
176. 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007).
177. Id. at 157-58.

178. Id.
179.

Id. at 155.

180. Id.
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conspiracy, 8 ' the Court went out of its way to support that holding by
referencing much broader, transsubstantive pleading requirements, such
as its discussion of Conley and countless post-Conley applications by the
lower federal courts, all drawn from multiple areas of civil litigation.
This extensive discussion of pleading requirements supports a prediction
that the Court's decision may not create a general requirement of
"heightened" fact pleading; instead, it will require the pleading of some
facts in a potentially broad but uncertain subset of civil claims whenever
a district judge concludes that fact pleading is necessary to establish a
legally required element in view of the surrounding legal or factual
landscape.
Several courts have already attempted to apply Bell Atlantic Corp.,
but have done so inconsistently, showing the uncertainty remaining after
Bell Atlantic Corp.12 Additionally, if the Court's decision has tightened pleading requirements transsubstantively, it has effectively reintroduced fact pleading from the pre-Federal Rules era. That, in turn, would
rekindle an ongoing judicial debate about which types of facts are
required-evidentiary or legal ("ultimate") facts. Further, the judicial
discretion inherent in a transsubstantive application of a new plausibility standard that is dependent on context would invite district judges to
8
dismiss cases under Rule 12(b)(6)"'
before discovery if they are
ideologically hostile to a claim; or if the case would otherwise likely
entail a great deal of complexity, time, or money. Such judges could look
at the allegations in plaintiffs' complaints, compare them to mandatory
statutory or case law claim elements, and subjectively decide whether
the allegations put defendants on "sufficient" notice. Accordingly, for
many cases, plaintiffs may be required to plead facts they have little
chance of learning before discovery, resulting in a potentially beneficial
interpretation for defendants.
The Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. repeatedly denied that its
decision required heightened pleading or detailed pleading of facts at the
complaint stage, outside of the very few situations in which such
pleading is required by statute or by Rule 9184 (the expressio unius

181. See, e.g., 127 S. Ct. at 1965, 1974.
182. See, e.g., Hyland v. Homeservices of Am., No. 3:05-CV-612-R, 2007 WL 2407233
at *3 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 17, 2007). The court in Hyland held that the plaintiffs met the
"plausibility standard" from Bell Atlantic Corp. because the plaintiffs alleged more than
parallel conduct, combined with bare references to agreement. Id. at *3. Further, the
court denied that the rule from Bell Atlantic Corp. required heightened pleading standards,
asserting that Bell Atlantic Corp. simply requires a closer look at what information the
plaintiff has provided, not the amount of information provided. Id.
183. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
184. FED. R. Civ. P. 9.
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point made in Leatherman regarding civil rights claims against
government defendants 8 5 and in Swierkiewicz regarding employment
However, by occasionally requiring the
discrimination claims'8 6).
pleading of any facts, the Court may have resurrected the Field Code
pleading distinction between conclusions of law and statements of
evidentiary fact.
While the Court seemingly intended to limit its holding to § 1
Sherman Act claims, it reached that result by explicitly relying on-but
restrictively reformulating-general notice pleading standards under
Rule 8(a)(2), including an express abrogation of the widely used "no set
of facts" language from Conley. Additionally, pro-plaintiff policies7
underlie § 1 of the Sherman Act (treble damages are granted).1
Therefore, although this decision may have been motivated by the
prospect of generating huge cost savings for the defendants and the
courts in major antitrust cases, it may have also restored certain Field
Code pleading principles transsubstantively in an amorphous category
of other federal civil cases.
AMBER
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